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NOTES
WALLACE v. JAFFREE AND THE NEED TO
REFORM ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The first amendment to the United States Constitution proclaims that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' It is the first prohibition against gov-
ernment action in the Bill of Rights, the first "protected" right of the indi-
vidual.2 A popular metaphor used to express the intention of the framers of
the amendment is that it was to erect a "wall of separation between church
and State." 3
However, as exemplified in the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Wallace v. Jaffree,4 this boundary that government cannot cross is
ambiguous and not amenable to precise definition.' Few issues before the
Court have been more controversial than those defining the boundary be-
tween permissible and impermissible "religious" government activity, partic-
ularly when public education is involved.6 In Jaffree, the Supreme Court
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Jackson claimed that the
establishment clause was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the minds of our
forefathers. Id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The first amendment, however, was the 296th
amendment to the Constitution proposed during the first session of Congress. For a chrono-
logical listing of the proposed amendments up to 1889, see H. AMES, PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1889, at 306 (1897).
3. The metaphor was first used by Thomas Jefferson in an 1802 letter to members of the
Danbury Baptist Association. It has been quoted many times by the Supreme Court. E.g.,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. It has not, how-
ever, always been quoted with approval. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2517
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (It is "a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which
has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.").
4. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
5. "The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the sectarian in American
life is elusive. The difficulty of defining the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox
central to our scheme of liberty." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
6. "The Court's historic duty to expound the meaning of the Constitution has encoun-
tered few issues more intricate or more demanding than that of the relationship between reli-
gion and the public schools." Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Witt, Court
Ruling Spurs New School Prayer Drive, 43 CONG. Q. 111 (June 8, 1985); Wermiel, Alabama
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held that the State of Alabama had violated this boundary when its legisla-
ture enacted a statute allowing a minute of silence for "meditation or volun-
tary prayer" at the beginning of each day in public schools.7
The petitioner in Jaffree sought a preliminary injunction against various
prayer activities conducted in his children's public school classes and
claimed that the Alabama statute allowing prayer and meditation was in
violation of the establishment clause of the Constitution.8 Chief Judge Hand
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
initially granted a preliminary injunction against the prayer activity. How-
ever, after a hearing on the merits, he dismissed the complaint, stating that
"the establishment clause. . . does not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion." 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed, relying solely upon prior decisions of the Supreme Court.' °
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed." Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, found that the Alabama statute violated the estab-
School Moment-of-Silence Law Is Struck Down, 6-3, by Supreme Court, Wall St. J., June 5,
1985, at 2, col. 3.
7. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) provides:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools,
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that
a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be
engaged in.
See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2481 n.2. For a discussion of other states' voluntary prayer statutes,
see infra note 93.
8. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982). The plaintiff initially charged that
three sections of the statute violated the establishment clause, ALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-
20.1, and 16-1-20.2. Section 16-1-20 is identical to § 16-1-20.1, see supra note 7, except that it
only allows "meditation," contains no mention of prayer, and pertains only to grades one
through six. The district court did not find any infirmity with § 16-1-20 because, in its view,
"there is nothing wrong with a little meditation and quietness." 544 F. Supp. at 732. The
charge against § 16-1-20 was later dropped by the plaintiff. 105 S. Ct. at 2481 n.l. Section 16-
1-20.2 authorized vocal prayer in public schools. The district court upheld this section, but
this decision was reversed on appeal. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
9. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983). See
infra note 11.
10. 705 F.2d at 1535. See id. at 1533-35. Between the time of the district court's decision
and its reversal by the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff petitioned the appellate court for an
emergency stay of the district court's decision. The circuit court denied the motion, where-
upon the plaintiff made a request to Justice Powell, in his capacity as Eleventh Circuit Justice,
to stay the trial court's order. In a memorandum opinion, Justice Powell granted the stay and
reinstated the injunction pending final disposition in the circuit court. Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983).
11. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2480. The Court found the decision of the district court to be
"remarkable." Id. at 2486. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984) (order affirming parts
of the decision, denying certiorari on the validity of § 16-1-20.2 and granting certiorari on the
constitutionality of § 16-1-20.1).
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lishment clause because its primary purpose was religious-to return volun-
tary prayer to public schools.' 2  Justice O'Connor, in a separate
concurrence, agreed with the majority's judgment 13 but suggested certain
revisions in the method of testing the constitutionality of such statutes or
similar state actions.' 4 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Rehnquist relied on an
historical analysis of the adoption of the establishment clause and concluded
that its framers merely intended it to preclude government from establishing
a national or state religion. He concluded that the statute in question did
not represent the establishment of a state religion within the meaning of the
clause and should not be struck down.15
This Note will analyze the Court's decisions prior to Jaffree on the issue of
religion in public schools, focusing primarily on the emergence of the three-
part test for determining the validity of state action against attack under the
establishment clause. 16 In addition, it will examine other approaches ap-
plied by the Court in establishment clause cases and how these approaches
are reflected in the various opinions in Jaffree. The appropriateness of the
test applied by the majority in Jaffree and its relevance to the establishment
clause in particular will be evaluated. The Note will then recommend a ref-
ormation of the test to better reflect the underlying principles of the estab-
lishment clause and, specifically, to reflect the fear of state coercion of
religious beliefs. It will conclude by demonstrating how a test that analyzes
the coercive nature of a state's activity will assist the Court in its decisions in
establishment clause cases, provide its decisions with a solid foundation
based upon principles underlying the establishment clause, and add uniform-
ity to the Court's methods of analysis.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO JAFFREE
A. The Emergence of the Lemon Test
In attempting to maintain the wall of separation between church and
state, the Court has struck down a variety of state and federal activities in-
volving religion. However, mere government involvement in a religious ac-
12. 105 S. Ct. at 2490 & n.43 (statements by Alabama State Senator Donald Holmes
relied upon by the Court to indicate the religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1) (Brennan, Marshall,
& Blackmun, JJ., joined in the Court's opinion). 105 S. Ct. at 2480.
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2496. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2493.
14. Changes are needed in the Lemon test "to make [it] more useful in achieving the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Id. at 2497. See id. at 2496-99; see also infra
notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
15. 105 S. Ct. at 2508-20. Justices Burger and White also filed dissenting opinions. Id. at
2505, 2508.
16. The full test was first announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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tivity does not necessarily render the activity unconstitutional. Indeed, the
Court has upheld many such activities. This apparent inconsistency has led
to confusion over the definition of the boundary separating permissible from
impermissible activities.
In finding violations of the establishment clause, the Court has struck
down, inter alia: state grants to sectarian schools and to parents who send
their children to nonpublic schools;' 7 reimbursements to nonpublic schools
for keeping various state-required records;18 state salary supplements to non-
public school teachers;' 9 shared time programs that provide classes at public
expense to nonpublic school students in classrooms located in and leased
from nonpublic schools;2" and the use of federal funds to pay public employ-
ees to teach in parochial schools.2 '
Not all activities involving church and state have been found to violate the
establishment clause. For example, the Court upheld federal appropriations
to a Roman Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia in 1899.22 Later,
the Court sanctioned the use of federal funds for the education of Sioux
Indians in Roman Catholic schools.23 Other activities that have been upheld
in subsequent decisions include: reimbursements to parents for busing their
children to parochial schools;24 state Sunday closing laws;25 the lending of
textbooks to children in nonpublic schools;26 tax exemptions for personal
and real property used for religious purposes;27 the use of federal funds for
the construction of buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular pur-
poses at religious institutions of higher education;28 the opening of each day
of state legislatures with a prayer;2 9 and the placement of a creche or other
religious symbols on public grounds during the Christmas holiday season.3"
Cases involving religion in public schools have been a fairly recent phe-
nomenon. Only six such cases were decided by the Court prior to Jaffree.3'
17. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
18. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
19. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
20. Grand Rapids School Distr. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
21. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
22. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
23. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
25. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
26. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
27. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
28. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
30. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
31. The six cases were: Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968); Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See Wood,
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In contrast to the Court's other decisions in establishment clause cases, those
challenging religious activities in public schools have been relatively uniform
in their outcomes. In all but one decision, the Court has found the activity
in question unconstitutional.3 2
The Court has continually expressed its aversion to state support for reli-
gious education. In the first case involving religion in public schools, McCol-
lur v. Board of Education, 3 the Court declared unconstitutional a "released
time" program offered by the Champaign, Illinois School District. Under
the program, time was set aside each week for religious instructors to come
into the public schools in order to conduct special religious classes.
Although attendance by the students was completely voluntary and the reli-
gious instructors were privately employed, the Court found the program to
be unconstitutional state aid to religious groups because it allowed religious
groups to spread their faith through the use of the tax-supported school sys-
tem.34 It expressed dissatisfaction with the close cooperation between the
state and religious organizations to effectuate the program and with the com-
pulsory attendance laws that ensured religious groups had convenient access
to students. Moreover, by releasing children from their legal duty to attend
school upon the condition that they attend religious classes, the state was
supporting and promoting religious activity. This program, proclaimed the
Court, fell "squarely under the ban of the First Amendment.,
3 5
The Court later limited the McCollum decision in Zorach v. Clauson36 by
upholding a "released time" program in the New York public schools. Un-
like the McCollum program, the Zorach program allowed children to leave
the public school grounds during certain hours to receive religious instruc-
tion at religious centers. Students were dismissed under this program only
upon written permission of their parents. Those students who were not dis-
missed from school remained in secular classes.3 7 In upholding the pro-
gram, the Court distinguished it from the program struck down in
McCollum3 because the religious instruction was not conducted on the pub-
Religion and Education in American Church-State Relations, 26 J. CHURCH & STATE 31, 35-
36 (1984). See generally Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1427-28 (1966).
32. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld a program in
which public school children were dismissed from regular classes to attend religious instruc-
tion off the school premises.
33. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34. Id. at 207-10.
35. Id. at 210.
36. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
37. Id. at 308.
38. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210.
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lic grounds, all costs associated with the program were borne by the religious
organizations, and there was no evidence of state influence or coercion. The
Court noted that in establishment clause cases the problem of determining
whether or not a practice is constitutional is one of degree. 39 Recognizing
that we are a religious people and noting that religion historically has
played a role in many aspects of government, the Court found it necessary to
distinguish between mere accommodation by government of religious activi-
ties and active promotion of religion or of one religious sect over another.4 °
Under the circumstances in Zorach, the Court determined that it "would
have to press the concept of separation of Church and State to [the extreme]
to condemn the present law on constitutional grounds."'4  Here, the Court
assured, the public schools were merely accommodating their schedules to
allow students to receive outside religious instruction, a practice that is not
condemned by either the history of the establishment clause or the tradi-
tional role religion has occupied with respect to government.
4 2
Viewing the activity in question in light of the history and original intent
of the establishment clause and the traditional relationship between govern-
ment and religion has been a useful tool of analysis for the Court. For exam-
ple, no case involving religion in public schools has presented so clear a
violation of the history and intent of the establishment clause as Engel v.
Vitale,"4 3 in which the Court struck down a New York State practice of com-
posing prayers and requiring their recitation in public classrooms.44 The
majority had no doubt that this was state-sponsored religious activity.45 In
reviewing the history of the establishment clause, the Court pointed out that
the government practice of composing prayers and compelling citizens to
recite them was one of the primary reasons many colonists left England to
seek religious freedom in America.46 As a result, the first amendment was
added to the Constitution to guarantee that neither the power nor prestige of
the federal government (or state governments through the fourteenth
amendment) could be used to control, support or influence the citizens' reli-
39. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308-09.
40. Id. at 313-14.
41. Id. at 313. Cf Wood, supra note 31, at 37 ("[T]he Court [in Zorach] affirmed that the
First Amendment means the separation of church and State, of which 'there cannot be the
slightest doubt.' " (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314)).
42. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315.
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. Id. at 422. The "official" prayer stated: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depen-
dence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Coun-
try." Id.
45. Id. at 424.
46. Id. at 425, 427. See generally id. at 424-35.
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gious activities.4 7 Therefore, state-composed school prayer fell squarely
under the ban of the establishment clause.
The historical approach of analyzing establishment clause cases began to
be displaced by a more concrete "test" in Abington School District v.
Schempp. a Schempp involved a Pennsylvania statute that required that por-
tions of the Bible be read aloud in public classrooms.49 In examining the
history of the establishment clause, as interpreted in prior cases, the Court
held that the establishment clause required the states to maintain strict neu-
trality toward religion.5" The Court found that in order to adhere to this
command, the statute or state activity must have neither a purpose nor pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 5 If either occurs, the activ-
ity is in violation of the Constitution. 2 The Court found that the purpose
and effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to inject the state into the process
of religious development of the individual, thereby breaching the required
neutrality and violating the establishment clause.53
The Court subsequently interpreted this "neutrality" to mean that a state
cannot prohibit the teaching of certain theories or subjects because they are
contrary to or not in accord with a particular religious dogma. In Epperson
v. Arkansas,54 the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the teaching
of the Darwinian theory of evolution in the public schools. Relying upon the
test enunciated in Schempp, " the Court found that the clear purpose of the
Arkansas statute was to prohibit the teaching of the Darwinian theory of
evolution because it was contrary to the fundamentalist sectarians' convic-
tion that the origin of man, as outlined in the Book of Genesis, is the exclu-
47. Id. at 429.
48. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
49. "At least 10 verses of the Holy Bible shall be read without comment, at the opening of
each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading
. . . upon the written request of his parent or guardian." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516
(Purdon 1962), 1959 Pa. Laws 1928 (1960); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205.
50. The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long
tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individ-
ual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is
not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or
effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and
religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226.
51. Id. at 222 (citing McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442; Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). The analy-
sis used in Schempp is a precursor to the first and second prongs of the Lemon test. See
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
52. 374 U.S. at 225.
53. See id. at 223-24.
54. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
55. Id. at 107 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222).
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sive theory of creationism.56 Thus, the purpose of the statute was to protect
and maintain the biblical approach to teaching in this area. According to
the Court, "the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all reli-
gions from views distasteful to them."
57
The test used by the Court in Schempp and Epperson developed into its
present form in Lemon v. Kurtzman,58 which challenged state financial aid
to religious schools rather than religious activities in public schools. At issue
in Lemon was the constitutionality of state salary supplements to teachers in
parochial schools in Rhode Island,59 and a Pennsylvania program under
which the state would purchase educational materials from nonpublic
schools as well as reimburse parochial schools for salaries of those teaching
secular subjects.6° Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, described the
three-part test to be used in analyzing these establishment clause questions.
Under the test, the statute (or state activity) must have a secular legislative
purpose, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster an excessive government entan-
glement with religion. 6' The Court, relying upon the premise that parochial
schools are operated to indoctrinate students with particular religious tenets,
found that it would be difficult for teachers in these schools to avoid such
indoctrination even in classes involving secular subjects for which state
funds were used. To ensure the religious neutrality of parochial schools, the
state would be forced to monitor their classes constantly.62 In addition, the
state would be required to audit school records to assure that the funds were
used solely for secular purposes. For these reasons, the state would be in-
volved in excessive and enduring government entanglement. 63 The pro-
56. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-08
57. Id. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Willson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)). The
statute in question stated: "It shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any...
Public School. . .to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a
lower order of animals .... " ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 (1960 Repl. Vol.). Violation of
the statute was considered a misdemeanor. The violator could be fined up to $500. Id. § 80-
1628. The statute was a consequence of the famous "monkey trials." Scopes v. State, 154
Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The Arkansas statute was enacted one year later.
58. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
59. Id. at 607-09.
60. Id. at 609-11.
61. Id. at 612-13.
62. Id. at 618-19.
63. Id. at 620. The Court reasoned that allowing such government entanglement in reli-
gion would lead to political division along religious lines. Although ordinarily political debate
and division are normal and healthy in a democratic system of government, division along
religious lines would lead to such conflict as to threaten our normal political process. This
[Vol. 35:573
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grams were therefore held unconstitutional.'
The Lemon test was first applied to cases involving religious activities in
public schools in Stone v. Graham, 65 in which the Court found unconstitu-
tional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments
in each public classroom. Although the state argued that posting the Com-
mandments was strictly for its historical value, 6 6 the Court rejected this ar-
gument and found that the purpose of the action was plainly religious in
nature, and was intended to instill the values of the Commandments in the
students.67 This was not a situation in which the Bible was used for a study
of history, ethics, or comparative religion, which the Court stated would be
constitutional.68 Relying on the three-part test of Lemon,6 9 the Court found
that the statute did not have a secular purpose because of its religious intent
and, therefore, was unconstitutional.7 °
B. Historical and Original Intent Analysis
Although the Court normally has relied on the Lemon test to analyze
establishment clause issues, in exceptional cases it has opted to return to the
historical approach of its earlier decisions. Under this approach, the Court
reviews the history surrounding the enactment of the establishment clause,
the statements of its framers, and the tradition of the practice in question to
concern, stated the Court, "was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect." Id. at 622. See id. at 622-24.
The Court's concern over divisiveness can be found in other cases involving the establish-
ment clause. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (Harlan, J., concurring); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
This concern can also be traced to the framers of the first amendment and their past exper-
iences with government sponsored religion. See Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger
Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (religious persecution of original settlers); Cahn, "The
Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1274, 1289 (1961). Indeed, James
Madison, the original sponsor of the first amendment, warned that anything resembling an
establishment of religion would sooner or later destroy the harmony the citizens of the new
nation had endeavored to build, provoke bitter inter-group hostilities, weaken the general en-
forcement of the laws and "slacken the bands of society." J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF 1785. The full text of the Memorial
can be found in Cahn, supra at 1293, app. B; Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969). See also Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2489 n.39.
64. 403 U.S. at 624-25.
65. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
66. The state statute required that this explanation be placed in small print at the bottom
of each poster. Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980).
67. 449 U.S. at 41.
68. Id. at 42 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225).
69. Id. at 40. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
70. 449 U.S. at 42-43.
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determine whether it is an activity against which the clause was intended to
guard.
In Marsh v. Chambers,7' the Court applied this approach to uphold the
practice of opening each day of the Nebraska state legislature with a prayer.
Recognizing that this practice has been a common tradition in federal and
state legislatures since the adoption of the Constitution, the Court found that
it was clearly not the intent of the framers of the first amendment to pre-
clude such practice. 72 The Court noted that although historical patterns
standing alone are not enough to justify contemporary practices involving
religion, historical evidence should be used to shed light on the intent of the
drafters of the establishment clause, particularly if the practice at issue was
also practiced by them.7 3 In the Court's view, the drafters' actions, as well
as their statements, reveal their intentions.74
The use of the historical approach, however, does not necessarily preclude
the use of the Lemon test within the same case, as demonstrated in Lynch v.
Donnelly. 75 In Lynch, the Court upheld the practice of displaying a creche
on public grounds during the Christmas holiday season. In upholding this
practice, the Court again relied on the events surrounding the passage of the
establishment clause, statements made by its supporters and opponents, and
the tradition of displaying the creche and allowing other religious activities
involving government.7 6 The Court went even further, however, and applied
the three prongs of the Lemon test but found no violation of any part of the
test. In viewing the displaying of the creche in the context of the Christmas
holiday season, the Court found insufficient evidence that its purpose was to
advocate a religious message. It determined that the purpose of the display
was simple recognition of the holiday season. The Court also afforded little
weight to the argument that the primary effect of the display was to advance
religion because the display had no more effect of advancing religion than
did other activities upheld by the Court, such as tax exemption for religious
organizations.7 7 Additionally, the Court found that because there was no
contact between the government and religious groups, there was no entan-
71. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
72. Id. at 786-91. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2494 n.4.
73. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
74. Id.
75. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. Id. at 673-78.
77. Id. at 681-82. The Court also found that displaying the creche had no more effect of
advancing religion than the use of public funds to transport children to sectarian schools, or
grants for the construction of educational facilities at church-sponsored colleges or universi-
ties, all of which have been upheld by the Court. Id. at 682 (citing cases).
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glement of the nature prohibited under the Lemon test.7 8
II. THE JAFFREE DECISION
In Jaffree,7 9 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, invoked the purpose,
effect, and entanglement test to strike down an Alabama statute allowing
voluntary silent prayer in public schools. Citing several instances in which
the sponsor of the statute stated (both prior to and after its enactment) that
its purpose was to bring voluntary prayer back to the public schools, the
Court held that the purely secular purpose prong of the test was "most
plainly" violated."0
The Court found additional evidence of the religious purpose of the stat-
ute by viewing its relationship with the other prayer statutes brought to issue
originally in the case. The statute in question, the Court noted, was almost
identical to the section preceding it, except that it allowed a moment of si-
lence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" whereas the former allowed a
moment of silence for "meditation" only. 8 ' The Court stated that the exist-
ence of the statute was "for the sole purpose of expressing the State's en-
dorsement of prayer activities" in public schools.8 2 Additionally, such
endorsement was "not consistent with the established principle that the
Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion."8 3
Thus, failing the first prong of the Lemon test, the statute was rendered un-
constitutional.8 4 The Court, therefore, saw no need to apply the other two
78. Id. at 684-85. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court failed to use the
Lemon test in deciding the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute requiring charitable organi-
zations, such as churches, to register with the state. The Court, relying upon history and past
precedents, stated that when presented with a state law granting a denominational preference
as opposed to state action supporting religion as a whole, it must use a strict scrutiny analysis
in adjudging the constitutionality of the statute. Larson, 465 U.S. at 244-46.
79. The original complaint filed by petitioners challenged the practice of school teachers'
reciting prayers before each class and before lunch. The teachers recited the Lord's Prayer at
the beginning of class and a variety of prayers at lunch hour, e.g., "God is great, God is good,
Let us thank Him for our food, Bow our heads we all are fed, Give us Lord our daily bread.
Amen." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d at 1528. The complaint was later amended to include the
statutes. See supra notes 7-8. The Eleventh Circuit found that the vocal prayer activity vio-
lated the establishment clause because the conduct "did not appear to be secularly motivated."
Id. at 1535. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to this part of the decision. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 466 U.S. at 925.
80. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490 & n.43. See supra note 12.
81. Id. at 2491. See supra note 8. For the full text of both sections, see Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
at 2481 nn.l-2.
82. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2492.
83. This idea of government neutrality, in the Court's view, was central to the notion of a
wall of separation between church and state. See id. at 2492 & n.50 (citing cases).
84. Id. at 2493.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
prongs of the test.85
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority that the statute indeed vio-
lated the establishment clause,8 6 but wrote separately to explain why mo-
ment-of-silence statutes in other states might not face the same infirmity.87
She also sought to share her reservations about the Lemon test and its use in
establishment clause cases. In her view, the principle reason why the statute
was unconstitutional was because its sponsors clearly created and enacted it
for the sole purpose of returning prayer to public schools.8" Although not
entirely abandoning the use of the Lemon test, she argued that the test was
in need of reconsideration and refinement by the Court "to make [it] more
useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment."
8 9
To achieve this, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should examine
closely whether the government's purpose in enacting the statute was to "en-
dorse" religion and whether the statute actually conveyed a message of en-
dorsement. 90 She recognized that it is impossible to separate church and
state completely because both must function in the same community, and
their activities will inevitably intertwine.9' The "endorsement test," she ar-
gued, "does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from
taking religion into account in making law and policy," but simply prohibits
it from "conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 92
Pointing out that twenty-five states currently have moment-of-silence stat-
utes, 93 Justice O'Connor reasoned that under her analysis even those statutes
85. As the Court stated, "no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a
statute does not have a clearly secular purpose." Id. at 2490.
86. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2497.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The test also includes whether the statute is intended to discourage religion gener-
ally or only a particular sect. See id. at 2499 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
93. In addition to the Alabama statute, see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (1984);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1607.1 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16a (1983); DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 14, § 4101 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 233.062 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1982); ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 122, § 771 (1983); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72.5308a (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115(A) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 20-A, § 4805 (1983); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.,
ch. 71 § IA (1982); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1565 (West 1984-1985); N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 18A: 36-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1'(1981); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-30.1 (1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.60.1 (1980); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R.I. GEN.
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that acknowledge a moment of silence may be used for prayer could pass
constitutional muster, provided they also allow meditation or reflection on
the day's activities.94 In her view, providing a moment of silence does not
necessarily denote that the state is endorsing prayer, whether it be prayer or
merely meditation, because the child is free to have his own thoughts.9 5
However, if it is clear from the face of the statute or its legislative history
that its purpose is to encourage prayer over other activities, such as simple
quiet time, then it is constitutionally flawed.9 6 "The crucial question is
whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that
children should use the moment of silence for prayer."9 7 Justice O'Connor
added that in viewing the intent underlying any statute, a court should defer
to the legislature that approved it.9"
Notwithstanding such deference, the Alabama statute in question failed
Justice O'Connor's test. In reviewing the text in light of its official legislative
history, Justice O'Connor had little doubt that its sole purpose was to return
LAWS § 16-12-3.1 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (1983); VA. CODE § 22.1-203
(1980); W. VA. CONST., Art. III, § 15-a.
The typical state statute calls for a moment of silence in the classroom for either meditation
or voluntary prayer, as in the case of Alabama Statute § 16-1-20.1. A few are similar to Ala-
bama Statute § 16-1-20 allowing a moment of silence for meditation only. See Jaffree, 105 S.
Ct. at 2498. For a useful chart comparing the various statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of
Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 407-08 (1983).
See also Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing Moments ofSilence in the
Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1874 n.1 (1983). Federal courts are divided on the
constitutionality of these statutes. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass.
1976) (upholding statute) with May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D.N.J. 1983) (strik-
ing down statute); and Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983)
(striking down statute).
94. "A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit
prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alterna-
tive over the others, should pass [the] test [of constitutionality]." Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2501
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See id. at 2505 (O'Connor J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed
that a statute simply allowing a moment of silence for meditation would be constitutional. Id.
at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring).
95. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court in Jaffree did
not address the question of how a child could pray during the moment of silence.
96. See id at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. (emphasis added) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
When the State provides a moment of silence during which prayer may occur at the
election of the student, it can be said to be adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs. But when the State also encourages the student to pray during a
moment of silence, it converts an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an
effort by the majority to use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to
participate in a religious exercise.
Id. at 2499 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. "If a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence statute
. ..then courts should generally defer to that stated intent." Id. at 2500; see id. at 2499-500.
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voluntary prayer to the schools. Therefore, the state was unconstitutionally
endorsing and encouraging religious activity.99
Justice Rehnquist, the principal dissenter,' 0O put forth a protracted expos6
of the history of the establishment clause and the intent of its drafters.
Through the use of historical accounts, he maintained that the establishment
clause was not intended to preclude states from allowing prayer in public
schools. Rather, the clause merely prohibited the national government and
state governments (through the fourteenth amendment) from establishing a
national or state church or from discriminating between religious sects., 0 '
Justice Rehnquist referred to several instances in which early presidents and
other national leaders expressed support for religious activities and even
sponsored such activities through the use of government funds.' °2 He also
cited excerpts from congressional debates prior to passage of the establish-
ment clause illustrating that members of Congress, as well as James
Madison, the original sponsor of the amendment, were primarily concerned
about the establishment of a national religion.'0 3
This evidence, reasoned Justice Rehnquist, led to the conclusion that the
underlying intent of the clause was not to require the government to act with
complete neutrality toward religion or erect an "impregnable wall" of sepa-
ration between church and state as the majority has maintained. "o Simply,
the clause required that government not favor one religion over another in
its actions. He argued that the three-part test of Lemon, which in his view
adds "mortar to the wall," suffers the same historical deficiencies as the wall
concept because it is in no way based on either the language or intent of the
99. Id. at 2501-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Chief Justice Burger expressed the view that the majority's decision placed the Court
in the position of acting hostile toward religion. He also found no threat to religious liberty
due to the statute. 105 S. Ct. at 2505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice White expressed his
agreement with the views of the Chief Justice. Id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 2514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). George Washington, John Adams and
James Madison all issued Thanksgiving proclamations. The proclamation signed by George
Washington contained the passage: "that we may . . . unite in most humbly offering our
prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations .... " 1 J. RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1902, at 64 (1897); 105 S. Ct. at 2514
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thomas Jefferson refused to make a proclamation, believing that
the designation of such a day was better left in the hands of the various religious societies. Id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See I WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (A. Lipscomb ed.
1904). Jefferson did, however, sign a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians under which federal
funds were used to support the tribe's Roman Catholic priest and church. Treaty with Kas-
kaskias, 7 Stat. 78 (Aug. 13, 1803).
103. 105 S. Ct. at 2509-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. "There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers in-
tended to build the 'wall of separation'...." 105 S. Ct. at 2516 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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drafters of the establishment clause.' °5 Justice Rehnquist concluded, there-
fore, that nothing in the first amendment prohibits the states from generally
encouraging prayer in public schools, as the Alabama statute had done.'
0 6
III. DICHOTOMY OF ANALYSIS
A. Problems with Lemon
Wallace v. Jaffree reflects the divergence of opinion within the Court as to
the proper form of analysis to be applied in establishment clause cases. In
finding the statute unconstitutional, the majority depended on the Lemon
test, which has become the standard approach in establishment clause
cases.'0 7 The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist reflects the historical
or original intent approach to analyzing such cases, a method also used by
the Court in the past.' 0 8  The concurrence by Justice O'Connor demon-
strates that these two approaches are not necessarily contradictory in nature
and perhaps can be reconciled, but only by modifying the Lemon test to
reflect more accurately the intent of the framers of the establishment
clause.'o 9 In essence, to commingle the two approaches would give the deci-
sions of the Court a more solid foundation in the history and intent of the
Constitution.
Part of the criticism of the Lemon test stems from the difficulty in defining
its basis or foundation. As Justice O'Connor stated, "[i]t has never been
105. Id. at 2517-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Grand Rapids
School Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1397-98 (6th Cir. 1983), afld sub nom. Grand Rapids School
Dist v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Members of Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F.
Supp. 1338, 1346-47 (D.R.I. 1977). The Court has continually reaffirmed its adherence to the
test. See, e.g., Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2494 ("Only once since our decision in Lemon . . . have
we addressed an establishment clause issue without resort to its three-prong test.") (Powell, J.,
concurring); Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3223 ("We... reaffirm that State action alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause should be measured against the Lemon criteria."); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. at 696 n.2 ("[E]ver since its initial formulation, the Lemon test has been consistently
looked upon as the fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis.") (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The test has also been criticized many times by members of the Court. See Aguilar, 105
S. Ct. at 3242-43 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2507 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("The Court's extended treatment of the 'test' of Lemon v. Kurtzman suggests
a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues.")
(citations omitted); id. at 2496 ("the Lemon test has proven problematic.") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
108. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
109. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our goal should be 'to frame a
principle . . . that is . . . grounded in the history and language of the first amendment
.... ' " (quoting Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard,
47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1963)).
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entirely clear . . . how the three parts of the test relate to the principles
enshrined in the Establishment Clause."' By not being based on the intent
and history of the clause, the test is subject to arbitrary application and
yields inconsistent and unprincipled results."1 ' More importantly, such a
broad test diffuses the meaning of the Constitution and displaces the intent
of the original drafters of the establishment clause with that of the members
of the Supreme Court." 2
A purely historical approach, such as Justice Rehnquist's, however, is
equally flawed. Specific activities that confront the Court today, such as
those involving the public school system, cannot always be traced back to
the days of the enactment of the establishment clause. "3 Thus, it is virtually
impossible to determine whether the framers intended the establishment
clause to preclude certain activities. The goal of the Court, therefore, should
be to identify the basic concerns of the drafters of the establishment clause
and to frame a test that reflects those concerns. Such a test should also be
capable of consistent application to the relevant establishment clause
problems. 14
B. Basis of the Establishment Clause-Coercion
Perhaps the most significant concern to the drafters of the establishment
clause was the fear of government coercion or attempts to influence the reli-
gious beliefs of individuals.' Although this same concern over coercion
can be distilled from many of the Court's decisions involving modern estab-
110. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. There has been renewed debate among justices and scholars over the proper method of
interpreting the Constitution. Central to the controversy is whether it is being interpreted in
such a way merely to support a particular ideology or to reflect the original intent of its fram-
ers. See, e.g., Meese Hits Judicial Activism: Constitution is Turned Into a "Chameleon, "Wash.
Post, Nov. 16, 1985, at A2, col. 4.
113. Our system of public education did not take root until approximately 1820. See 1 C.
BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 810-18 (1937).
114. See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47
MINN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1963); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. This freedom against government coercion of religious beliefs is part of the "individ-
ual's freedom of conscience," the central liberty that the Court has said "unifies the various
clauses in the First Amendment." Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2487. Elsewhere, the Court has
observed:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by [government action] of the ac-
ceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of religious worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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lishment clause cases, the test used by the majority in Lemon fails to reflect
it.
Coercion of religious beliefs by the state was a principle reason why many
colonists left England and other countries to settle in America where they
could practice their religion freely and openly.' 16 The practice of state-es-
tablished religion, however, was not foreign to America. Indeed, many colo-
nies had established "official" religions.117 Both James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson recognized the destructive nature of allowing state-estab-
lished religion and the need to secure religious freedom. Their concerns
eventually led to the passage of the Bill to Establish Religious Freedom in
the Virginia Legislature, and, three years later, the first amendment to the
Constitution in the U.S. Congress.' For Madison and Jefferson, religious
freedom was the crux of the struggle for freedom in general.119
As the Court pointed out in Jaffree, freedom of religion meant the free-
dom to choose what religion one will practice, the freedom to choose not to
practice any religion, as well as the freedom to practice one's chosen religion
without government coercion or interference.' 20 The freedom to choose and
the freedom to practice were central to the notion of religious liberty encom-
passed in the religion clauses of the first amendment.'21 The framers of the
first amendment recognized, as did the majority in Jaffree, that true religious
convictions cannot be instilled in a person through the heavy hand of gov-
ernment. As the majority in Jaffree declared, those "religious beliefs (that
are] worthy of respect are [those that are] the product of free and voluntary
116. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Kurland, supra note 63, at 2 ("It
cannot be forgotten that a very large number of our original settlers . . . were here to escape
the religious intolerance of their native lands, whether Calvinists or Catholics, Baptists or
Methodists, or the multitudes of smaller religious groups whose religious beliefs subjected
them to persecution."); Cahn, supra note 63, at 1289.
117. Engel, 370 U.S. at 427 & n.9. See Kurland, supra note 63, at 2.
118. Everson, 330 U.S. at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See generally id. at 33-39 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 265
(1967); S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 67-453 (1902);
L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 71-90 (rev. ed. 1967).
119. 330 U.S. at 34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
120. 105 S. Ct. at 2488 ("[T]he individual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."). There is signifi-
cant dispute as to whether the first amendment protects against government interference with
the individual's freedom not to choose any religion at all or whether it merely prohibits the
government from supporting one religion or religious sect over another. According to Justice
Rehnquist, the first "Congress did not mean that Government should be neutral between reli-
gion and irreligion." Id. at 2513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 593-94 (1891); THE COMPLETE
MADISON 299-301 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
121. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
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choice by the faithful ... ,122
The concern over coercion or influence of the individuals' religious beliefs
by government has consistently played a major role in past Court decisions
involving religion in public schools. 123 Even in Zorach v. Clauson, the only
case in which the religious activity was upheld, the Court declared that if the
state was indeed being used to persuade or coerce students to take religious
instruction, "a wholly different case would be presented."'
124
This concern about coercion is also evident in the "endorsement" concept
that Justice O'Connor discussed in her Jaffree concurrence. In speaking of
government endorsement of religion, she recognized that the power and
prestige of the state, through its financial resources and influence, can be a
powerful force behind a religion or religious belief and can have an enor-
mous coercive effect on the individual. Such an endorsement, in her view,
constitutes state influence and thus infringes upon the religious liberty of the
individual.125 The threat of coercion is particularly acute in cases involving
children, who tend to be more "susceptible to pressure to conform and to
participate in the expression of religious beliefs that carry the sanction and
compulsion of the State's authority."' 126 Justice O'Connor recognized the
delicate nature of children and the potentially coercive power of the state in
the formulation of their religious beliefs.
127
C. Bridging the Gap Between Abstract and Historical Analysis
The question of the proper role of religion in our society has been a con-
122. 105 S. Ct. at 2488.
123. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 217 ("The preservation ... of religion from censorship and
coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruction [in
public schools] other than religious, leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctrina-
tion in the faith of his choice.") (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 ("The First
Amendment was added to our Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor
the prestige of the Federal [or State] Government(s] would be used to control, support or
influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say .... "); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104-
05; Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 ("If the [posting of the] Ten Commandments are to have any effect at
all, it will be to induce the school children to . . . obey [them]."). For a useful analysis of a
constitutional standard with coercion as its basis, see Choper, supra note 114, at 343-50.
124. Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
125. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at
431).
126. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1046
(1963). See Choper, supra note 114, at 370-71.
127. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at
431; Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Kauper, supra note 126, at 1046
("[I]mmature and impressionable children are susceptible to a pressure to conform and to




troversial issue since our country's inception. Central to this controversy is
the issue of prayer in public schools, be it vocal or silent.1 28 In Jaffree, the
Court focused on the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test to strike down
a statute allowing a moment of silence in public school classes.' 29 The ra-
tionale of the decision exemplifies how the use of the Lemon test can add
confusion to the Court's rulings. The confusion is particularly evident in
view of other recent Court decisions. In Marsh v. Chambers, for example,
the purpose of opening each legislative day with a prayer was plainly not
secular, yet it was upheld by the Court. 3° The same is true of Lynch v.
Donnelly, 131 in which the Court upheld the displaying of a creche on public
grounds during the holiday season.
For the decisions of the Court to merit public confidence and respect, they
must be consistent and clearly express the principles espoused in the Consti-
tution. The purpose, effect, and entanglement test of Lemon, although a
convenience to the Court, is too abstract to achieve this goal.' 32 A more
meaningful inquiry in establishment clause cases would be to question
whether the challenged practice threatens those consequences that the fram-
ers deeply feared:
133
The fear of coercion of religious beliefs by government action was central
to the framers of the first amendment and was a primary impetus for its
passage. 134 The Court should therefore change its inquiry to reflect this fear.
By focusing its analysis on whether the government's action has the direct or
indirect effect of influencing or coercing an individual's religious beliefs, the
Court would be achieving several important goals. First, it would be estab-
lishing a standard based on the history and intent of the first amendment,
thus providing a firm historical foundation for the Court's decisions and
those of lower courts. Second, it would provide more consistency in its deci-
sions and sufficient flexibility to resolve the different types of issues that may
arise in establishment clause cases.
The use of this analysis would also reconcile the Court's decisions in
Marsh 135 and Lynch 136 with Jaffree. 137 In both Marsh and Lynch, there was
128. See, e.g., Witt, supra note 6; Ferrara, Reading Between the Lines of the School-Prayer
Decision, Wall St. J., June 11, 1985, at 30, col. 2.
129. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2489-90.
130. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
131. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
132. The test is used freely on a wide variety of activities. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
756 (state financial aid to parochial schools); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (allegation
that denial of federal funds for abortions promoted the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church).
133. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. Cahn, supra note 63, at 1289; see supra note 116.
135. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
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no discernible coercive effect as a result of the religious activity. In Marsh,
the audience consisted of adults, who are less prone to pressure from their
peers or the state and are more capable of formulating their own religious
beliefs without being influenced by the prayer activity.' 38  In Lynch, the
practice of placing a creche on public grounds existed for many years with
no evidence indicating that it influenced or coerced anyone's religious be-
liefs.139 Finally, by focusing on the coercive effect of a particular activity,
courts would not be obligated to determine the intent of state legislators in
passing various acts as required in the Lemon test. This "intent" can be
manipulated by legislatures, and in many states, legislative intent is simply
not recorded. 40
IV. CONCLUSION
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court applied an abstract test to strike down a
state statute providing for a moment of silence in public schools. Prior to
the development of the three-part Lemon test, the Court concentrated on the
principles underlying the establishment clause, especially the fear of govern-
ment coercion. Since Lemon, however, it has opted to use "an easy bright-
line approach" for addressing complex establishment clause cases.' 4 ' It is
difficult to understand how some of the infirmities found by the Court in
Jaffree through the use of the test are those against which the establishment
clause was intended to guard. Although the outcome of the Jaffree decision
may have been the same using the coercion analysis, the decision of the
Court would have been more soundly based on the principles of the estab-
lishment clause if the coercion analysis had been applied. The Court must
reform its approach in establishment clause cases to reflect more accurately
the principles espoused in the first amendment. By focusing on the coercive
136. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
137. Fear of coercion may also explain the different outcomes in Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981), in which the Court upheld student prayer group meetings at public colleges
and universities and Bender v. Williamsport School Dist. 741 F.2d 538, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1984)
(en banc), vacated on grounds of standing, 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (U.S. March 25, 1986), in which
the Third Circuit found unconstitutional the same practice in public high schools.
138. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
139. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683. The coercion analysis would also reconcile the outcomes of
Lynch and Schempp. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. The practice in Schempp
of Bible reading clearly had the potential of influencing children's religious beliefs. Both prac-
tices were religious in nature, yet the Court in Lynch found that the purpose behind displaying
the creche was not religious. It would be better if the Court would look at the coercive nature
of the activity in question.
140. Legislative history is not recorded in Arizona, New Jersey, or New Mexico. See Note,
The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes, supra note 93, at 1879 & n.35.
141. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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nature of the activity or statute upon an individual's religious beliefs, the
Supreme Court would achieve this important goal.
Patrick F. Brown

